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COMMENTS
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES:
PRESERVING AN UNEQUAL ALLOCATION
AND THE POTENTIAL PROMISE OF
PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION
Savanna R. Leak*
In the United States, the relative allocation of peremptory challenges
afforded to the defense and prosecution is at once in a state of paralysis and
flux. The federal system maintains an unequal allocation of peremptory
challenges between the defense and prosecution in noncapital offenses, while
many states have moved toward equalization of the number of peremptory
challenges afforded to each side over the last few decades. Currently, only
five states and the federal system have retained an allocation of peremptory
challenges that affords the defense a greater number of peremptory
challenges in noncapital offenses. Further, only nine states and the federal
system maintain an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges in any
capacity. This inconsistency strikes a chord fundamental to the fairness of
our justice system, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s failure to
eliminate the discriminatory exercise of the peremptory challenge in Batson.
This Comment argues that, at this time, the federal system and remaining
states should not move toward equalizing the number of peremptory
challenges afforded to the defense and prosecution because allocating a
greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense best serves
theoretical fairness in the justice system, including maintaining the
community’s perception the justice system’s fairness. Additionally,
*
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bringing this Comment to fruition. Professor Shari Diamond provided incredible guidance
and thoughtful feedback in the early stages of this Comment. Members of the Journal of
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allocating a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense serves
actual fairness by reducing opportunities for prosecutors to use peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner. Finally, this Comment takes the novel
approach of considering how the “progressive prosecution” movement may
justify movement toward equalization in the future, by shifting the
community’s perception of fairness and by increasing actual fairness in the
exercise of peremptory challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
The peremptory challenge, though not constitutionally guaranteed, has
long been considered essential in ensuring that the accused is tried before an
impartial jury, a right guaranteed to the accused under the Sixth
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Amendment.1 At the same time, the history of peremptory challenges
demonstrates their potential for abuse, as lawyers, and particularly
prosecutors, have used peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of
race and sex.2 Despite general agreement in the legal community regarding
the importance of peremptory challenges and the need for oversight in how
the prosecution and defense use them, the federal system and the states do
not reach consensus on whether the defense should be afforded a greater
number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution, or whether the two
sides should have an equal number.
Instead, the relative allocation of peremptory challenges to the defense
and prosecution is at once in a state of paralysis and flux. Since the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated in 1946, the federal system
has maintained an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges that affords
a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the
prosecution in noncapital cases, despite repeated legislative attempts to
equalize the number of peremptory challenges.3 However, legislative
proposals at the state level to equalize the number of peremptory challenges
for each side have been successful. Currently, only nine states maintain an

1

See Proposed Amendments to The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 54
(1977) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Richard L. Thornburg, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen.)
(“Although nothing in the Constitution requires the Congress or the State to permit any
peremptory challenges, nonetheless, the challenge, by virtue of its roots in English common
law and its persistent use in this country dating from colonial to modern times in both the
Federal and State criminal justice systems, has become established as a vital and necessary
part of trial by jury.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . . . .”); C.J. Williams, On the Origins of Numbers: Where
Did the Number of Peremptory Strikes Come from and Why Is Origin Important?, 39 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 481, 483 (2016).
2
See Williams, supra note 1, at 483 (“Peremptory strikes are viewed as problematic and
fraught with potential for abuse, but at the same time recognized as critical to seating fair and
impartial juries.”).
3
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure currently allocate a
greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution in noncapital
felonies and an equal number of peremptory challenges to both sides in capital cases. Id. The
most significant proposal to amend the Federal Rules to allocate an equal number of
peremptory challenges to the prosecution and defense in noncapital cases occurred in 1977,
but was rejected by the Judiciary Committee after three days of oral testimony by members of
the legal community. See Hearing, supra note 1. This Comment does not focus on the
distinction between capital and noncapital cases but rather focuses on the general resistance
at the federal level to equalization in contrast to the trend among states toward equalization.
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unequal allocation of peremptory challenges to some degree,4 and only five
states afford a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than
the prosecution in noncapital offenses.5 This is a substantially different
picture than in the mid-twentieth century, when twenty states allocated a
greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense for at least some
offenses. 6 The stark contrast between the federal system’s resistance to
4
States adopt varying practices with respect to the peremptory challenge; some states
afford a greater number of peremptory challenges for certain categories of felonies, but not
others. See, e.g., N.J. R. GEN. APP. R. 1:8-3(d) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-1 (West 2020))
(allocating twelve peremptory challenges to the State and twenty peremptory challenges to the
defense “upon indictment for kidnapping, murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter,
aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual
contact, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, robbery, forgery if it constitutes a crime of the third
degree as defined by N.J.SA § 2C:21-1b, or perjury,” and allocating both the State and the
defense ten peremptory challenges “in other criminal actions”).
5
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-305 (West 2020) (allocating ten peremptory challenges to the
State and twelve peremptory challenges to the defense in prosecutions for capital murder and
allocating six peremptory challenges to the State and eight to the defense in prosecutions for
all other felonies); DEL. R. CRIM. P. SUPER. CT. 24 (allocating twelve peremptory challenges
to the State and twenty peremptory challenges to the defense in capital cases, and allocating
six peremptory challenges to both the State and defense in noncapital cases); MD. CODE ANN.
CRIM. LAW § 4-313 (West 2020) (allocating the defense twelve and the State ten peremptory
challenges in capital cases, the defense ten and the prosecution five in felonies carrying a
sentence of at least twenty years, and four to each side in “other noncapital felonies”); MINN.
R. CRIM. P. 26.02(6) (2020) (allocating nine peremptory challenges to the State and fifteen
peremptory challenges to the defense in cases punishable by life imprisonment, and allocating
three peremptory challenges to the state and five to the defense for any other offense); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 606:3 (2020) (allocating twenty peremptory challenges to the defense in
capital murder trials, fifteen in first degree murder trials, and three in any other case; and
allocating ten challenges to the State in capital murder trials, fifteen in first degree murder
trials, and three in any other case); N.J. R. GEN. APP. R. 1:8-3(d) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:21-1 (West 2020)) (allocating twelve peremptory challenges to the State and twenty
peremptory challenges to the defense “upon indictment for kidnapping, murder, aggravated
manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault,
aggravated criminal sexual contact, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, robbery, forgery if it
constitutes a crime of the third degree as defined by N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-1b, or perjury,” and
allocating both the State and the defense ten peremptory challenges “in other criminal
actions”); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-606 (allocating sixteen peremptory challenges to the
State and twenty-four to the defense if the offense charged is punishable by death, eight
peremptory challenges to the State and twelve to the defense if the offense charged is
punishable by life imprisonment, and three peremptory challenges to the State and five to the
defense in all other cases); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 14-9-200 (2020) (allocating three peremptory
challenges to the State and five to the defense in all felony cases); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1)
(allocating two peremptory challenges to the State and six to the defense in offenses
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year).
6
Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1503, 1536 n.223 (2015). Until the 1970s, twenty states maintained an unequal
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equalizing the number of peremptory challenges for noncapital cases and the
states’ widespread adoption of equalization is surprising, if not troubling. The
peremptory challenge is an important component of jury selection.7 After
jurors have been questioned and both the prosecution and defense have made
challenges for cause, both sides may use their respective peremptory
challenges to strike prospective jurors without providing a reason for the
strike.8 Accordingly, peremptory challenges serve as a kind of safety net at
the end of jury selection, whereby parties can eliminate jurors they suspect
might be biased or partial to the other side but who do not qualify for a
challenge for cause.9
However, many in the legal community consider peremptory challenges
to be “fraught with potential for abuse” due to the subjective and potentially
discriminatory nature of eliminating jurors without being required to provide
an explanation.10 In 1986, the Supreme Court addressed this concern in
Batson v. Kentucky.11 The Batson decision prohibited prosecutors from using
peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely based on race,
requiring them to give a neutral reason for any strike.12 The Batson
prohibition was later extended to the defense’s use of peremptory challenges
and to discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge to strike jurors on the
basis of sex.13 Despite Batson, however, abuse of the peremptory challenge

allocation of peremptory challenges in some form. These states included Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and West Virginia. Id.; see also id. at 1537 n.225 (“Since the 1970s, asymmetry
has been abandoned in Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee.”).
7
Brent J. Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials,
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 230 (1986).
8
Id. at 228.
9
Id. at 227, 230; see also Roberts, supra note 6, at 1512 n.67.
10
Williams, supra note 1, at 483.
11
476 U.S. 79, 79–80 (1986).
12
Id. at 93–98. The Court established a three-step test to determine whether the
prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge for a discriminatory reason. Id. Batson’s first
step “requires the objecting party to establish a ‘prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.’
Step two shifts the burden to the party attempting to exercise the peremptory to give neutral
reasons that are ‘related to the particular case to be tried’”; step three “requires the trial judge
to decide whether the reasons are pretextual.” Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the
Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2006) (citation
omitted).
13
See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson’s prohibition to
apply to defendants’ discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511
U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (extending Batson’s prohibition on discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges to challenges based on gender).
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is not an ancient relic, and the Batson test is generally considered to be
insufficient to rein in discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge,
particularly by the prosecution.14 A recent and poignant example of
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge is the 2019 Supreme Court
case, Flowers v. Mississippi, where the Court found extraordinary evidence
of discriminatory intent by the prosecution in its use of peremptory
challenges.15 For these reasons, legislators, judges, and the academic
community have long considered how peremptory challenge procedures may
safeguard and balance the interests of defendants, victims, and the
community, and better promote the fair administration of justice. Some have
even called for the abolition of the peremptory challenge altogether.16
Given the importance of the peremptory challenge as well as its
potential for abuse, the legal community should take note of states’
substantial departure from the federal system and consider which approach
better serves fairness in our criminal justice system. One might be skeptical
about the importance of the relative allocation of peremptory challenges at
either the federal or state level, as the difference might involve only a handful
of peremptory challenges that may or may not have a noticeable impact on
the outcome of a trial. But this is a naïve view. Even one peremptory
14

See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (2014) (“[T]he Batson regime has proved spectacularly unsuccessful. It
has not ended racial discrimination in jury selection . . . .”); Jere W. Morehead, When a
Peremptory Challenge is No Longer Peremptory: Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate
Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633 (1994) (“Despite
the Batson rule’s noble purpose, it cannot prevent clever lawyers from using peremptory
challenges to strike potential jurors based upon impermissible rationales so long as they
pretend to use other, permissible bases.”); Scott W. Howe, Deselecting Biased Juries, 2015
UTAH L. REV. 289, 293 (2015) (“[The] Batson doctrine does not adequately regulate
[peremptory challenges].”).
15
See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2245 (2019). Flowers is the most recent
Supreme Court decision to consider Batson violations. The case is exceptional for several
reasons, including that Flowers was tried for the same series of murders six times. In Flowers,
Flowers appealed his sixth trial conviction, claiming that the lead prosecutor, Doug Evans,
had used his peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner to strike five black prospective
jurors. Id. In November 2019, the NAACP and other organizations filed a class-action suit
against Evans, alleging that he and other prosecutors in his office had struck black jurors 4.4
times more frequently than white jurors. Mihir Zaveri, White Prosecutor, Doug Evans, Asks
to Recuse Himself from Curtis Flowers Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/doug-evans-curtis-flowers.html [https://perma.cc/Z
Q2U-PRBW]. Evans later asked to recuse himself from Flowers’s ongoing case. Id.
16
See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today
will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process.
That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”);
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L.
REV. 369, 370–71 (1992); Marder, supra note 12, at 1714.
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challenge provides potential for abuse on the basis of race or sex and may be
“critical to seating fair and impartial juries.”17 And the defendant’s and
community’s perception of the justice system may depend on the relative
allocation of peremptory challenges. Accordingly, the legal community
should monitor changes and trends in this area closely and consider whether
an unequal or equal number of peremptory challenges for the prosecution and
defense best serves the justice system.18
Arguments for and against equalizing at the federal and state level have
in large part centered on theoretical and practical notions of “fairness.”19 For
the purposes of this Comment, theoretical fairness encompasses arguments
focused on the relative “rights” and “interests” of the defendants, victims of
crime, and the community in an impartial jury, as well as how the community
perceives the justice system.20 Practical, or “actual” fairness encompasses
arguments considering empirical data on the parties’ abuse of peremptory
challenges in jury selection. This Comment argues that the states’ trend
toward equalization of the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the
prosecution and defense is unwise because an unequal allocation best serves
both notions of fairness, considering the arguments highlighted in the debates
over the relative allocation of peremptory challenges throughout its history
and the practical use of the peremptory challenge today. If, however, an equal
number of peremptory challenges for each side is a worthy goal—a question
explored further infra—this Comment argues that the progressive
prosecution movement may justify equalizing the number of peremptory
challenges between the prosecution and defense in the future.

17

Williams, supra note 1, at 483.
Id. at 510–11 (“Whether each side receives the same number of peremptory strikes is
a vital issue. Most state legislatures afford each side the same number of peremptory strikes
in criminal cases, while the federal rules grant defendants more peremptory strikes in felony
cases, but not in capital or misdemeanor cases.”).
19
See Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538–41; see also Note, Judging the Prosecution, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2131 (2006) (discussing peremptory challenges in the context of “two
related considerations: the extent to which [criminal] process is perceived as being fair and
just, and the extent to which [criminal] process is actually fair and just”). Though the author
discusses abolition of the peremptory challenge, this framework is helpful for categorizing
arguments regarding the proper allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution
and defense as well.
20
Theoretical fairness includes, for example, arguments made by proponents of the
Victim Rights Bill of 1995, which sought to equalize the number of peremptory challenges
for noncapital federal felony offenses in order to protect victims’ rights relative to the
defendant. See, e.g., Victim Rights and Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1995, S. 1483,
104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Kyl).
18
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The notion that the states should maintain an unequal allocation of
peremptory challenges is not new in legal scholarship.21 However, this
Comment explores anew the bases for various allocations, which have shifted
over time. Further, it takes a novel approach in considering how the
progressive prosecution movement may shape the proper allocation of
peremptory challenges and perhaps even justify the current shift toward equal
allocation of peremptory challenges. Part I discusses the origins of the
peremptory challenge and justifications for equal and unequal allocation of
peremptory challenges. It considers the English roots of the peremptory
challenge, the adoption of the peremptory challenge in the United States, the
legislative history surrounding Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure—which governs the allocation of peremptory challenges—and
state legislative history. Part II discusses the justifications for the right of
both the prosecution and the defense to the peremptory challenge,
considering arguments from legislative history and relevant case law,
including Batson and its progeny. Part III discusses whether the trend toward
equalization is wise, considering the justifications provided in Parts I and II.
Finally, Part IV examines how progressive prosecution may change the
current landscape of fairness in the peremptory challenge context to warrant
an equal number of peremptory challenges for both sides.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FEDERAL AND STATE ALLOCATIONS OF THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Peremptory challenges are limited in number, set in the federal system
by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the states by statute. 22

21

Scholars who have considered the proper relative allocation of peremptory challenges
include Anna Roberts, Katherine Goldwasser, Richard Friedman, and C.J. Williams. For their
perspectives, see, respectively, Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538–39 (“[A]symmetry [in the
allocation of peremptory challenges] does not equate to unfairness and, indeed, has been a
foundational component of efforts to create a fair criminal justice system . . . . [A]n
asymmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges offers particular opportunities with respect
to the difficulties of the Batson doctrine.”); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal
Defendant’s Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial,
102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 808 (1989) (considering whether Batson-like restrictions should apply
symmetrically to the defense as it does to the prosecution); Richard D. Friedman, An
Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories?, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 507, 507 (1992)
(considering the relative importance of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution
and considering asymmetry in the allocation of peremptory challenges to both sides);
Williams, supra note 1, at 481 (reviewing the bases for various allocations of peremptory
challenges in the United States over time and arguing that the proper allocation must be
determined through empirical study).
22
Coburn R. Beck, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 961, 964 n.27 (1998).

2021]

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

281

Currently, the allocation of peremptory challenges varies between the federal
government and among the states. In the federal system, Rule 24(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictates the number of peremptory
challenges allocated to the defense and prosecution in criminal cases.23 The
numbers vary by severity of the offense.24 In capital cases, the defense and
prosecution are each allocated twenty peremptory challenges.25 In noncapital
felony cases, the defense is allocated ten peremptory challenges and the
prosecution is allocated six.26 By contrast, most states allocate an equal
number of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution in both
capital cases and noncapital cases, with the absolute number of peremptory
challenges increasing with the severity of the offense.27
Some states, however, allocate an unequal number of peremptory
challenges to the prosecution and defense, granting a greater number of
peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution. Even among these
states, the peremptory challenge allocation varies. Minnesota, for example,
grants a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the
prosecution in cases involving life sentences and noncapital felonies,28 while
Delaware grants a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense
than the prosecution in capital cases, but an equal number of peremptory
challenges to both parties in noncapital felonies.29 Maryland, on the other
hand, maintains a sort of hybrid system of allocation: the state allocates a
greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense for capital felonies
and for noncapital felonies that carry a sentence of twenty years or more, but
it allocates an equal number of peremptory challenges to the state and defense
in other noncapital felonies.30
This Part traces the historical development of the peremptory challenge
and highlights justifications for the relative allocation of peremptory
challenges between the prosecution and the defense in the federal system and
among the states. The origins of the peremptory challenge demonstrate an
early concern with the relative allocation of peremptory challenges between
the prosecution and defense. Further, legislative history surrounding
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules and to state legislation
demonstrates that proponents and opponents of equalization have primarily
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
Id.
Id.
Id. This Comment does not examine peremptory challenges in misdemeanor cases.
Roberts, supra note 6, at 1535; see also supra note 5.
MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 26.02(6) (2020).
DEL. R. CRIM P. SUPER. CT. 24(b).
MD. CODE. ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-420 (West 2020).
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focused on the notion of “fairness” in considering the proper allocation of
peremptory challenges between the prosecution and the defense.
A. HISTORY OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE ALLOCATION: FROM
ENGLAND TO THE UNITED STATES

Since the fourteenth century, jurists have viewed the peremptory
challenge’s role in trial procedure with profound respect.31 Additionally,
lawmakers historically appeared more concerned with the relative allocation
of peremptory challenges—and the relative importance of the peremptory
challenge as to the defense and the prosecution—than the absolute number
of peremptory challenges.32 In England, peremptory challenges can be traced
back to medieval times.33 Initially, the Crown had an unlimited number of
peremptory challenges, which served as a symbol of the absolute power or
“infallib[ility]” of the monarchy.34 In 1305, however, Parliament eliminated
the Crown’s peremptory challenge in a step toward democratization, noting
that a jury “selected by the Crown was ‘obnoxious to justice.’”35
Although the Crown’s right to the peremptory challenge was technically
eliminated, the Crown soon began to exercise its power to “stand aside”
jurors. This practice allowed the Crown to strike jurors in much the same way
the peremptory challenge did.36 The stand aside involved a prosecutor
initially assigning a potential juror a challenge for cause without
explanation.37 The court then instructed that juror to stand aside until all

31
See Morrison, supra note 14, at 10; Marder, supra note 12, at 1692 (“There are both
powerful historical and practical reasons for preserving the peremptory challenge. Justice
Stevens has [a] deep respect for history . . . [which] might lead him to maintain the peremptory
[challenge] . . . .”).
32
See Judith Heinz, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison of
Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
201, 207–08 (1993). Early changes in the allocation of peremptory challenges involved
shifting or overhauling the allocation of peremptory challenges to increase or decrease the
power of the government as to the defense, as well as promoting “the appearance of fairness
to the accused.” Id. at 208–211; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 505–07 (suggesting that
while the absolute number of peremptory challenges, historically, seems to lack logic or
coherence, legislators’ concern with the relative number of peremptory challenges is reflected
in legislative history).
33
Heinz, supra note 32, at 207.
34
Alexa B. Moeller, Has the “Last Petal” Fallen?: Beauty of the Modern Jury Trial and
the Beast Known as the Peremptory Challenge, 63 S.D. L. REV. 193, 196 (2018) (citation
omitted).
35
Heinz, supra note 32, at 208.
36
Id. at 209.
37
Id.

2021]

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

283

venire members had been examined by the defense and prosecution.38 Only
once the “stood aside” juror was called again would the prosecutor have to
prove the challenge for cause.39 Simply put, the government could have
prospective jurors stand aside from jury selection and pass over that juror to
the next before showing cause for removing them.40 The court only seated a
stood aside juror thereafter if, after questioning remaining jurors, a jury could
not be seated without him.41
The lawmakers who created the stand aside in England did so with the
perception that juries would be “too defense-oriented,” likely believing that
jurists could “conduct[] trials fairly, even though the Crown controlled jury
selection.”42 According to one scholar, the creation of the stand aside “marks
the beginning of a conflict between confidence in the fairness of the
prosecutor as an officer of the court versus a suspicion of placing too much
power in the prosecutor as representative of the sovereign.”43 Nonetheless,
the decision to allocate no peremptory challenges to the Crown and an
unlimited number to the defense was symbolically significant, leading
English jurists to consider the peremptory challenge a “defendant’s
privilege.”44 After 1305, only defendants were permitted to exercise
peremptory challenges.45 By 1530, parliament set a fixed number of
peremptory challenges for the defense: defendants were allocated thirty-five
peremptory challenges for cases involving high treason and twenty
challenges in all other cases.46
B. ADOPTION OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN THE UNITED
STATES

Peremptory challenge practices in the United States initially mirrored
the English common law.47 At the time of the United States’ founding,
defendants were given thirty-five peremptory challenges in cases of treason
and twenty peremptory challenges in cases of murder or other felonies.48 The
prosecution was able to stand aside jurors, but it was not able to exercise any
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Williams, supra note 1, at 489.
Id. at 488–89.
Id. at 489.
Heinz, supra note 32, at 210.
Id. at 210–11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 211.
See Williams, supra note 1, at 502.
See id.
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peremptory challenges.49 Although the Framers considered adding a
constitutional guarantee to the peremptory challenge, “they decided this right
was implicit in a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”50 Instead, the
Constitution granted to the defendant only the right to trial by an impartial
jury under the Sixth Amendment, leaving peremptory challenges to be
established at common law or by Congress.51
In 1790, Congress passed an act implementing the first peremptory
challenge allocation.52 That act granted the defense thirty-five peremptory
challenges in cases involving treason and twenty challenges in all other
capital cases.53 Following the English tradition, Congress allocated no
peremptory challenges to the prosecution.54 In 1865, however, Congress
passed a second federal statute allocating “a small number of peremptory
challenges to the prosecution” and a greater number to the defense.55
Congress continued to modify the absolute number of peremptory
challenges allocated to the defense and prosecution over time. In 1872,
Congress allocated the defense twenty peremptory challenges and the
prosecution five peremptory challenges in capital cases.56 For any other
felony, the defendant was entitled to ten peremptory challenges and the
government was entitled to three.57 However, “there is nothing in the
legislative history” of the Act that implemented the change explaining why
these particular numbers were chosen.58 Then, in 1911, Congress increased
the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the prosecution to six in
capital cases, maintaining twenty peremptory challenges for the defense.59
Again, legislative history does not provide the reasoning behind this
change.60

49

Id.
Moeller, supra note 34, at 197.
51
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 585–86 (1919); see also Williams, supra note
1, at 504 (citation omitted).
52
Williams, supra note 1, at 504.
53
Id. (citing 1 Stat. 119 § 30 (1790)).
54
Id. at 495.
55
Roberts, supra note 6, at 1534; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 504–05. Prior to the
passage of the second statute, certain states had allowed the prosecution to exercise the “stand
asides” employed by the Crown in England, but the practice received substantial criticism and
was mostly given up with the 1865 statute. See id. at 491–94.
56
Williams, supra note 1, at 505.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
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Peremptory challenges in the state context followed a similar trajectory
at first. After the country’s founding, states began to codify peremptory
challenges in criminal trials.61 They typically allocated fewer peremptory
strikes to the prosecution than to the defendant.62 Some states refused to
allocate any peremptory challenges to the prosecution, allowing the
prosecution to raise only for-cause challenges.63 Over time, however, state
courts reduced the absolute number of peremptory challenges adopted from
the English system.64 At the same time, state governments began to increase
the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the prosecution and started
to move toward an equalization of the number of peremptory challenges
allocated to the prosecution and the defense.65 Scholar Anna Roberts notes
that between 1854 and 1939, twenty-seven states moved from an unequal
allocation of peremptory challenges to an equal number of peremptory
challenges.66
C. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

In 1946, the first version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
was promulgated, and the allocation of peremptory challenges set at that time
has not changed. The Rules provide the defense and prosecution with an
equal number of peremptory challenges in capital cases and the defense with
a greater number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution in noncapital
felony cases.67 Notably, the first draft, which was proposed in 1941, allocated
an equal number of peremptory challenges to the prosecution and the
defense.68 The second draft, proposed a year later, maintained an equal
61

Id. at 503.
April J. Anderson, Peremptory Challenges at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century:
Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in Practitioners’ Trial Manuals, 16
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 18–19 (2020) (“Although state procedures were hardly uniform, in
general they reduced prosecutorial power in picking the jury, as compared either with common
law procedures or with the challenges most states afforded defendants.”).
63
Id. at 19, 19 n.118.
64
Williams, supra note 1, at 502–03.
65
Id.
66
Roberts, supra note 6, at 1536 n.224. These states included Rhode Island, Colorado,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Idaho, Iowa, Nevada, Florida, Vermont, Texas,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Virginia, Washington, Montana,
California, North Dakota, Ohio, Louisiana, Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Wyoming, and New
York. Id.
67
FED R. CRIM. P. 24(b); Roberts, supra note 6, at 1534.
68
During the drafting of the Rules jurists debated the allocation of peremptory challenges
to the defense and prosecution, and the proposed equal allocation was ultimately rejected.
Roberts, supra note 6, at 1534. In 1941, an advisory committee began drafting the Federal
62
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number of peremptory challenges for each side—twenty challenges in
treason and capital offenses and six challenges in noncapital felonies.69 The
defense was jointly allocated ten peremptory challenges in noncapital felony
cases if multiple defendants were to be tried.70
The Advisory Committee received many proposals regarding the
relative allocation of peremptory challenges throughout the drafting
process.71 For example, in considering the Second Preliminary Draft in 1944,
a representative for the Bar Committee for the Western District of Tennessee
argued that a defendant should always be allocated a greater number of
challenges than the government because “[t]he jury comes to know the
government attorneys better than the attorney for the defendant, as the latter
appears only in part of the cases,” and “the defendant’s attorney does not
have the means to investigate the background of prospective jurors, and so
must rely more on hunches than the government.”72 One United States
Attorney argued that the government “could not object to the equalization of
challenges,” but that the government had not felt disadvantaged in the past
by the defendant’s greater number of challenges.73 Yet another individual
argued that in cases of treason or capital offenses, the defendant should have
twenty peremptory challenges and the government should have six
peremptory challenges, but for all other offenses, the defense and
government should both be allocated six peremptory challenges.74
Ultimately, the Advisory Committee settled on the current rule in its Final
Report of the Advisory Committee of June 1944.75 In capital cases the
defense and prosecution would each be allocated twenty challenges.76 For
noncapital offenses, the government would have six challenges, but the
defendant or defendants together would have ten.77 “If there was more than
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lester B. Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29
F.R.D. 43, 44–45 (1962). The first draft of Rule 24—at the time, Rule 47—“was modeled
quite closely on Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .” Id. See First Preliminary
Draft of Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 (1941). The draft of criminal Rule 47 provided that “[t]he number
of peremptory challenges which will be permitted to the defendant . . . and the number which
shall be permitted to the attorney for the government shall be the same.” Orfield, supra note
68, at 44–45; see also Second Preliminary Draft of Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 (1942).
69
Orfield, supra note 68, at 45.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 44–45.
72
Id. at 52.
73
Id. at 48–49.
74
Id. at 53.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 43; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. advisory committee’s final report on Published
Drafts of the Rules at p. 47 (1944).
77
Id. at 53.
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one defendant the court might allow additional challenges.”78 “The Supreme
Court adopted this draft without any change.”79
Another major call for reform in the federal system came in 1977, when
the House Judiciary Committee reviewed a bill to amend Rule 24.80 The bill
sought to equalize and reduce the number of challenges afforded the
prosecution and the defense.81 The debate regarding the change focused on
“whether the proposed changes in [R]ule 24(b) are compatible with the
[S]ixth [A]mendment right of the accused to an impartial jury” and would be
wise, given practical use of the peremptory challenges by both parties.82 A
substantial amount of testimony in opposition focused on the historical
allocation of peremptory challenges, the greater interest of the defense than
the prosecution in the outcome of a criminal case, and the practical advantage
that would be afforded to the prosecution if the number of peremptory
challenges were to be equalized.83
Multiple constituents argued that a reduced number of peremptory
challenges would not be sufficient to “enable the defendant to achieve a jury
free of bias against the accused.”84 Jay Schulman of the National Jury Project
cited the 1790 act of Congress allocating to the defense “a favorable ratio of
four to one over the Government in capital cases” and the 1911 act allocating
to the defense a favorable ratio of two to one in felony cases.85 Schulman also
pointed to practical evidence that it was “the U.S. Attorney who is most likely
to eliminate people from a particular group” whereas the defense was “more
likely to take jurors from whence they come and to operate on whim or
caprice.”86 He further pointed to research demonstrating that a substantial
portion of the community believed an indictment was “tantamount to guilt,”
citing surveys conducted by the National Jury Project.87 His testimony
implied that the “advantages” to the defense of the presumption of innocence
and the government’s higher burden of proof would not be enough to
eliminate the risk that the community might view an indictment as indicative
of guilt.88 Accordingly, those advantages to the defense would not be

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id. at 53–54.
See Hearing, supra note 1, at 1.
Id. at 57 (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen. Richard L. Thornburgh).
Id. at 3.
See id. at 3–5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3, 6.
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sufficient to warrant allocating an equal number of peremptory challenges to
the prosecution and defense. As another member of the American Bar
Association argued more simply, “The defendant is the one that goes off to
jail.”89 This sentiment was echoed by another testifier, who explained that
while the right to the peremptory challenge is important to both the
government and the defendant, it is more important to the defendant because
the defendant is “personally involved in the result of the trial.”90
On the other hand, supporters of the amendment argued that the
prosecution has an equal right to an impartial jury. For example, the standing
Attorney General argued that the government, as the representative of the
public, “is entitled no less than the defendant to a fair trial;” for this reason,
he argued it was “appropriate to permit both the Government and the
defendant to exercise, at least initially as a matter of right, an equal number
of peremptory challenges.”91 He stated, “[T]he inequality that exists . . . is
not justifiable in terms of any apparent policy embodied in the rule itself.” 92
Ultimately, however, the amendment was rejected.93 The Judiciary
Committee explained that it would be “unwise” to reduce the number of
peremptory challenges allocated to each side because testimony
demonstrated that prosecutors used peremptory challenges to systematically
exclude classes of people more often than the defense.94
In 1995, proponents of the Victim Rights and Domestic Violence
Prevention Act unsuccessfully sought to amend the Federal Rules and
equalize the number of peremptory challenges between the defense and
prosecution for noncapital felony offenses.95 The goal of the bill was to
“strengthen the rights of domestic violence victims in Federal court and
hopefully set a standard for the individual states to emulate.”96 With respect
to the peremptory challenge, proponents of the bill sought to “level [the]
playing field” between the defendant and the victim.97 Proponents explained,
“Violence in our society leaves law-abiding citizens feeling defenseless . . . .
Federal law currently gives the defense more chances than the prosecution to
reject a potential juror. [This] bill protects the right of victims to an impartial
89

Id. at 134.
Id. at 216.
91
Id. at 57.
92
Id. at 57–58.
93
Id. at 278.
94
Id.
95
Victim Rights and Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1995, S. 1483, 104th Cong.
(1st Sess. 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
96
141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
97
141 CONG. REC. 12796–97 (1995) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
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jury by giving both sides the same number of peremptory challenges.”98 A
similar argument was made by another proponent of the Victim Rights Bill.
The proponent stated, “[W]e should give victims an impartial trial, jury, and
a fair shake. To do that, I think we need to give both the prosecution and the
defense simply the same number of peremptory challenges. It only seems
right, and it only seems fair.”99
D. STATE ALLOCATIONS OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

States that amended their peremptory challenge rules to provide for
equality between the prosecution and defense have also done so on the basis
of victims’ rights, arguing that there is no justification for granting the
defense an advantage in the selection of an impartial jury, and also on the
logic of saving courts time and resources.100 As scholar Anna Roberts
explains, “State legislators and members of the executive admit to ignorance
about the historical picture and bafflement about the current need for [an
unequal allocation of peremptory challenges].”101 In particular, states have
proven more open to victims’ rights arguments, as advocates have
successfully argued that victims’ rights warrant an equal allocation of
peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution, whereas victims’
rights justifications have failed at the federal level. For example, Oregon
adopted equality of peremptory challenges pursuant to its Crime Victims’
Bill of Rights.102 The Bill relied on the notion that “victims of crime are
entitled to fair and impartial treatment in our criminal justice system” to
justify an equal allocation of peremptory challenges.103 Further, in Georgia,
another state that adopted an equal allocation of peremptory challenges, a
member of the legislature explained that a system that granted the defense a

98

141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
141 CONG. REC. 12796–97 (1995) (statement of Sen. DeWine).
100
See Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538 (“Efforts to equalize the allocation of peremptory
challenges are explained on the basis that there is no apparent justification—other than
attempting to give an unfair advantage to the defense—for maintaining asymmetry.”). Roberts
also explains,
99

On the issue of rights . . . the notion that constitutional rights are accorded to the
defendant, and not to either the prosecution or the alleged victim, is frequently
obscured. One does not have to look further than the discussions about moving toward
symmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges to see examples of a notion that rights
not only exist on both sides but also are equal on both sides.
Id. at 1547. This argument is present in the victims’ rights supporters’ claims. Id. at 1547–48.
101
Id. at 1538 (citation omitted).
102
Id. at 1548.
103
Id.
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greater number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution gave “more
rights to the defendant than to the victim.”104
Multiple states that maintain an unequal allocation of peremptory
challenges have considered reforming the number and allocation of
peremptory challenges as well. One example is the State of New Jersey.
Currently, the state allocates the defense twenty peremptory challenges and
the prosecution twelve peremptory challenges in cases where a defendant is
charged with offenses carrying more serious penalties, such as murder,
sexual assault, and arson.105 For “other criminal actions,” the defense and the
state are each entitled to ten peremptory challenges.106 In 2000, New Jersey
assembly members introduced Bill A727 for review by the legislature, which
sought to equalize the number of peremptory challenges in the “serious
crimes” listed above, and to reduce the absolute number of peremptory
challenges allocated to both sides.107 The Bill proposed that the state and the
defense would each receive eight peremptory challenges if the defendant was
tried alone and six per defendant if defendants were tried jointly.108 The
purpose proffered for the Bill was to “reduce the number of peremptory
challenges afforded the prosecution and defense in order to reduce the
disparity between the two sides and to decrease the delay in the progress of
these criminal cases.”109 However, the Bill never progressed past the New
Jersey Assembly’s Judiciary Committee. 110
In 2005, the Special Supreme Court Committee on Peremptory
Challenges and Jury Voir Dire produced a report to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey recommending changes to peremptory challenges and voir
dire.111 The Committee recommended eliminating the distinction between
“serious” offenses and other offenses, and reducing the absolute number of
peremptory challenges afforded to both parties.112 However, the Committee
emphasized that there should continue to be a greater number of peremptory
challenges allocated to the defense compared to the prosecution.113 The
104

Id. at 1547–48.
N.J. R. GEN. APP, R. 1:8-3(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:21-1 (West 2020).
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S. A727, 209th Leg., 2000 Sess. (N.J. 2000).
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S. A727, 209th Leg., 2000 Sess. (N.J. 2000) (LEXIS) (on file with JCLC).
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N.J. SPEC. COMM. ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND VOIR DIRE, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND JURY VOIR DIRE
(2005), https://njcourts.gov/notices/reports/peremptory_voirdire.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAG2
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Committee, echoing arguments against equalizing peremptory challenges at
the federal level, explained that despite significant changes in the criminal
justice system, “there remains some residual advantage to the State in a
criminal trial.”114 Therefore, “in recognition that the right to trial is a right
possessed by the criminal defendant,” the Committee concluded that the
defense should have a greater number of peremptory challenges than the
state.115 However, as noted above, the state today only maintains an unequal
allocation of the number of peremptory challenges between the prosecution
and defense for the more serious offenses listed above and not in “other
criminal felony” cases, despite the fact that in its recommendation, the
Committee suggested an unequal allocation of eight peremptory challenges
to the defense and six peremptory challenges to the state in all criminal
cases.116 Currently, the state allocates ten peremptory challenges to each side
in “other criminal” felonies.117
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE
In the United States, judges and scholars have defended the peremptory
challenge as instrumental in seating an impartial jury, a right guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution, despite the fact that the peremptory challenge itself is
not constitutionally granted to either the defense or the prosecution.118
However, acknowledgement that the peremptory challenge may be used
unfairly or discriminatorily is almost as old as the peremptory challenge
itself, as evidenced by the 1305 decision in England to eliminate the Crown’s
right to the peremptory challenge.119 Thus, consideration of whether
peremptory challenges should be allocated to the prosecution at all is
warranted. This Part will consider the various justifications for both the
defense and prosecutorial right to the peremptory challenge, as well as
Batson’s impact on these justifications.

114
Id. With respect to changes in the criminal justice system, the Committee referenced
the “provision of counsel for indigent defendants,” shifting societal attitudes, and the
“expansion of the jury pool.”
115
Id. at 53.
116
Id. at 50–52.
117
N.J. R GEN. APP, R. 1:8-3(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:21-1 (West 2020).
118
See supra Part I.
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See Heinz, supra note 32, at 208.
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A. THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused the right to trial by an
impartial jury.120 Although not itself constitutionally guaranteed, the
peremptory challenge has long been viewed as a guarantor of this right, and
therefore an important, if not indispensable, facet of trial procedure.121
The notion that a defendant has a right to the peremptory challenge is
more deeply ingrained in the psyche of American jurists than the
prosecution’s right to the peremptory challenge; however, the right of both
parties to use this tool is commonly accepted.122 As discussed, when the
practice began in the United States, peremptory challenges were granted only
to the defendant.123 Since then, most jurists have staunchly supported the
defendant’s right to the peremptory challenge. For example, in its 1965
decision Swain v. Alabama,124 the Supreme Court noted the peremptory
challenge’s historic significance, describing it as “one of the most important
of the rights secured to the accused.”125 Further, the dissent in Swain stated:
“[H]ow necessary it is, that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should
have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert
him; the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom
he has conceived a prejudice . . . .”126 Jurists who opposed an equal number
of peremptory challenges during debate surrounding the 1977 proposed
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure invoked similar
sentiments.127
However, in other decisions, the Supreme Court has made clear that the
state also maintains an important interest in this tool. In its 1887 Hayes v.
Missouri decision, for example, the Supreme Court explained, “The public
prosecutor may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror
offered . . . and yet find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection
to him. In such cases, the peremptory challenge is a protection against his
120

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (“Experience has shown that one of the
most effective means to free the jury box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the
peremptory challenge.”); see also Goldwasser, supra note 18, at 827; Williams, supra note 1,
at 483 (“Peremptory strikes are . . . recognized as critical to seating fair and impartial juries.”).
122
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 21, at 513, 510 (noting that “[p]rosecutors’
peremptories stand on weaker ground than do the accused’s” and that “historical background
suggests . . . [that] . . . [peremptories] exist principally for the benefit of criminal
defendants”).
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See supra Section I.B.
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380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marder, supra note 12, at 1692.
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Swain, 380 U.S. at 242.
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being accepted.”128 Additional decisions have highlighted the same point. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Soares, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court noted: “While we have highlighted a defendant’s right to be protected
from the improper use of peremptory challenges, we recognize the
Commonwealth’s interest in prosecutions that are tried before the tribunal
which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.”129 That
court held that the prosecution was “equally to be entitled to a representative
jury, unimpaired by improper exercise of peremptory challenges by the
defense.”130 States’ reform of the peremptory challenge based on the victims’
rights bills discussed above also support this view.
B. BATSON, ITS PROGENY, AND ITS FAILURES

The Supreme Court has recognized that abuse of the peremptory
challenge, particularly by prosecutors, disserves defendants, the broader
community, and the justice system as a whole. In Batson v. Kentucky, the
Supreme Court held that prosecutors’ use of the peremptory challenge to
exclude jurors on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.131 In that case, the Court lowered the incredibly
high burden Swain v. Alabama placed on the defendant to prove that the
prosecution had discriminatorily used its peremptory challenges.132 The
Court in Batson articulated a three-part test—a defendant could make a prima
facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he was a member
of a distinct racial group; (2) the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges
to remove venire members of the defendant’s race; and (3) the evidence
raised an inference of discrimination by the prosecutor.133 Batson’s
prohibition has been extended to prohibit discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by the defense and to prohibit discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of gender.134
Unfortunately, many scholars and jurists argue that Batson and its
progeny do little in practice to prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges, due to the high evidentiary burden placed on a party claiming a
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120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n.35 (Mass. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.; see infra Part I.C.
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476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); see also Morehead, supra note 14, at 629.
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Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93.
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See id. at 96.
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See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (extending Batson’s prohibition on
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to challenges based on gender); Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson’s prohibition to apply to defendants’
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Batson violation and the ease with which a party can concoct a race-neutral,
nondiscriminatory reason for striking a potential juror.135 As one justice
argued in his dissent in Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, the Batson prohibition
on race-based peremptory challenges is “effectively nullified by evidentiary
requirements that virtually insulate a prosecutor’s use of the peremptory
challenge to exclude jurors.”136 Once a party brings a Batson challenge, the
challenged party must “develop a record in voir dire to defend the peremptory
challenges used against a claim of discrimination” while the challenging
party must develop a “similar record to argue that the peremptory challenges
were racially motivated.”137 Then, a Batson challenge requires a court to “sift
through counsel’s words for patterns or pretexts of discrimination.”138
Additionally, once a Batson challenge is made against a lawyer, the lawyer
need only provide a neutral reason for striking the juror.139 This is an easy
bar to meet, as “lawyers [can] offer absurd pretexts for their discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges and, in doing so, evade Batson’s
protections.”140
Researchers considering North Carolina’s Batson record over the past
three decades have echoed this concern.141 Tellingly, “in all the 114 North
Carolina appellate Batson cases involving minority jurors decided on the
merits since 1986, the courts have never found a substantive Batson violation
where a prosecutor has managed to articulate even one reason, however
fantastic, for the peremptory challenge.”142 The researchers also cited orders
issued by North Carolina Judge Gregory Weeks in 2012 as further evidence
demonstrating “the regularity with which North Carolina prosecutors offer
pretextual reasons for [discriminatory] peremptory strikes,” which were
often “thinly-disguised.”143 For example, prosecutors might provide neutral
reasons for their challenges such as “lack of eye contact, air of defiance, arms
folded, leaning away from questioner, and evasive.”144 Additionally, many
appellate courts are deferential to trial courts in reviewing Batson challenges,
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Morehead, supra note 14, at 633–34.
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meaning that failures of trial courts to “adequately [] police peremptory
challenges” are often left undisturbed.145
In light of Batson’s failures, scholars have suggested a number of
approaches to prevent discriminatory abuse of the peremptory challenge.
These include substantially limiting the absolute number of peremptory
challenges, as well as the more drastic approaches of abolishing the
peremptory challenge for the prosecution or abolishing the peremptory
challenge entirely.146 Despite these proposals, the right of both parties to use
peremptory challenges seems to be guaranteed, at least for now. One scholar
cites the 2005 ABA Principles for Juries and Jury Trials as an example of
“lawyers’ unwavering support for the peremptory challenge” for both
parties.147 While the ABA’s proposal was “cutting-edge in many ways” with
respect to jury procedure, it largely “preserve[d] the status quo” with respect
to the peremptory challenge, dictating that the peremptory challenge should
be available to both parties.148
Further, in the 1990s a committee of jurists in Arizona, a “state at the
vanguard of jury reform,” conducted a study of the jury system and voted to
retain peremptory challenges for both parties.149 The committee reasoned that
peremptory challenges are necessary “if jury selection [is] to be fair in fact
and seen to be fair by the litigant, who would see that he or she had some
degree of control over an otherwise random selection process.”150
Additionally, in a study conducted in 1995 to assess federal district court
judges’ views on the importance of peremptory challenges in criminal cases,
judges overwhelmingly believed that on balance, peremptory challenges in
their current state contribute positively to the justice system.151 Less than
sixteen percent of district court judges supported eliminating the peremptory
challenge entirely.152 Further, most of the judges who would retain the
peremptory challenge “would also retain current rules and practices” in the
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Roberts, supra note 6, at 1512.
See Williams, supra note 1, at 483–84; Broderick, supra note 16, at 369.
147
Marder, supra note 12, at 1685–86; AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY
TRIALS (2005), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/american_jury/
principles.authcheckdambna.com/bnabooks/ababnalannual/2005/023.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8RZ-REKB].
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Marder, supra note 12, at 1686.
149
Id. at 1687–88.
150
Id. at 1689 (quoting B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona
Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 285 (1996)).
151
Christopher E. Smith & Roxanne Ochoa, The Peremptory Challenge in the Eyes of
the Trial Judge, 79 JUDICATURE 185, 186–87 (1996).
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Id. at 188.
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federal system.153 Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the judges were
split along political lines with respect to their view on problems associated
with peremptory challenges.154 When asked which of multiple factors was
problematic in the context of peremptory challenges, “Republican appointees
were more likely to view the unequal number of challenges allocated to each
side as creating an unfair advantage for criminal defendants,” while
Democratic appointees were more likely to consider peremptory challenges
problematic because they are “a vehicle for producing discrimination in jury
selection and composition.”155
Overall, the consensus appears to be that the right of both parties to the
peremptory challenge is so ingrained in the jury system that it will not be
eliminated for either side in the near future. Thus, we must consider how the
peremptory challenge system can be improved without completely
eliminating the right and with a legal doctrine that is insufficient to root out
discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge in practice.
III. THE WISDOM OF EQUALITY: FROM THE THEORETICAL RIGHT TO THE
PRACTICAL EXERCISE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
The origins and legislative history of the peremptory challenge
demonstrate that the legal community has considered the somewhat esoteric
concept of “fairness” between the parties as central to the allocation of
peremptory challenges to the prosecution. However, notwithstanding the
theoretical “right” of each side to an impartial jury, arguments in legislative
history also make clear that if the practical exercise of peremptory challenges
results in a favorable advantage to one side, an equal allocation of peremptory
challenges is not warranted. As highlighted in testimony given during the
1977 effort to reform the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant
is the subject of the trial, and thus the consequences of a biased jury directly
affect his freedom and potentially whether he lives or dies.156 To this end,
defense counsel is charged with “zealously” advocating on behalf of her
client.157 On the other hand, the prosecutor represents the interests of victims
of crime and the community at large, and must, as a “minister of justice,”
seek justice in the legal system.158 The view that victims have an interest
153

Id.
Id. at 187.
155
Id.
156
See infra Part I.C.
157
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
158
Id. r. 3.8 cmt. 1. Similarly, scholar Maureen Howard has commented on the
prosecutor’s peculiar role: “‘[D]espite the theoretically adversarial nature of our system, the
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equal to that of defendants to a fair and impartial jury was highlighted in the
1995 proposal to equalize the allocation of peremptory challenges as part of
the Victim Rights and Domestic Violence Prevention Act, for example.159
If viewed in a vacuum, only an equal allocation of peremptory
challenges to the defense and prosecution would be “fair.” This notion,
however, discounts the importance of how the defendant and community at
large view the fairness of the justice system. Further, this view is premised
on the assumption that the exercise of peremptory challenges is not shaped
by factors that allow an inordinate opportunity for peremptory challenges to
result in a jury partial to the government, thereby undermining the fairness
of a technically equal system.160 This Part argues that allocating a greater
number of peremptory challenges to the defense than to the prosecution better
serves theoretical and actual fairness.
A. THE THEORETICAL RIGHT TO THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE &
PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS

The notion of fairness is at the heart of the argument to equalize the
number of peremptory challenges, especially when argued on a victims’
rights basis. However, for a number of reasons, the defendant’s and
community’s perception of the justice system’s fairness is best served by
maintaining an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges, notwithstanding
victims’ rights.161
prosecutor is among the most important arbiters of justice’ due to her discretion in
investigating and resolving criminal matters, thus elevating her to a ‘quasi-judicial’ role.”
Maureen A. Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive
Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 407 (2010) (quoting Alan M.
Dershowitz, Foreword to JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, at ix
(1985)).
159
141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
160
See Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Jay Schulman). But see Williams, supra
note 1, at 511–12 (“Ultimately, this is a policy question . . . . If Congress determines that
criminal defendants need more peremptory strikes than the government to ensure a fair jury,
then logically, criminal defendants should always be afforded more peremptory strikes than
the government. In other words, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be changed
to provide the defendant more peremptory strikes in all types of cases: capital, felony, and
misdemeanor. If, on the other hand, the legislatures conclude the government has an interest
equal to a criminal defendant in seating a fair jury, then the number of peremptory strikes
afforded each side should always be equal. It is difficult to rationally justify the inconsistent
distribution of peremptory strikes currently in place under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.”). This Comment disagrees with this view by considering more holistically the
values served by an unequal or equal allocation of peremptory challenges.
161
See Friedman, supra note 21, at 511–12. Friedman explains the importance of the
defendant’s perception of fairness in the justice system with respect to peremptory challenges
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First, it is important that the defendant view the process by which he is
tried as just. As one scholar explains, “[g]iven the nature of a criminal trial,
in which the state attempts to deprive an individual of liberty (or even of life),
increasing not only the actuality of fairness but also the accused’s perception
of fairness is a crucial goal.”162 While victims’ perception of justice is
important, the broader community’s perception of justice is also better served
by an unequal number of peremptory challenges, given the reality that
prosecutors may be better able to use their peremptory challenges to strike a
class of people from the jury and other imbalances in the criminal justice
system. Notably, some argue that improper use of peremptory challenges by
the prosecution, such as striking jurors on the basis of their race, harms the
community’s perception of justice by delegitimizing the justice system.163 In
this view, minority constituents are symbolically harmed when minorities are
discriminatorily struck in open court, and the court environment gives the
appearance of the American government’s seal of approval on such
behavior.164 Further, there is evidence that members of the public in fact
expect that prosecutors further justice and are concerned with the means by
which prosecutors secure convictions.165 This community concern was
recently reflected in the public outcry in response to Flowers v.
Mississippi.166 In November 2019, the NAACP filed a class action lawsuit

and implies that this goal may be even stronger than actual fairness. He goes so far as to argue
that “even if an asymmetrical rule on peremptories led to a substantially greater number of
errors in favor of the accused as compared to those that would be yielded by a symmetrical
rule . . ., that would not be enough to condemn the asymmetrical rule.” Id. at 519.
162
Id. at 512.
163
See Note, Judging the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges Limits
the Dangers of Prosecutorial Discretion, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2137 (2006) (“Peremptory
challenges do indeed occasion symbolic and localized harms—both to defendants and to
communities of jurors—by permitting the exclusion of minorities from juries.”); Alafair S.
Burke, Prosecutors & Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1475–76 (2012) (“Prosecutors
also represent a diversely constituted public. As such, they are in essence lawyers for the very
communities disenfranchised by race-based peremptory challenges.”); Marder, supra note 12,
at 1696.
164
See Marder, supra note 12, at 1696 (“The exercise of peremptories takes place in open
court, beneath the American flag, the judicial seal, the watchful eye of the judge . . . .”).
165
Burke, supra note 163, at 1475 (noting that the public expects that prosecutors will
not only convict but also further justice, and that people are “more likely to comply with legal
authority when they perceive it to be legitimate, thereby creating a more enduring form of
compliance . . . .”).
166
139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019); see also supra note 15.
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against the prosecutor in that case for his discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges “on behalf of every potential Black juror in the district.”167
Additionally, the notion of fairness does not depend on equality of rights
between the prosecution and defense in other areas of the criminal justice
system. Indeed, inequalities in these other areas of the system actually
strengthen the community’s perception of the system’s fairness.168 Most
fundamentally, this inequality is represented in the presumption of innocence
of the accused that the prosecution must overcome beyond a reasonable
doubt.169 Additionally, due process requires that the prosecution disclose
certain evidence to the defense, while the defense has no corresponding
duty.170
Furthermore, strong procedural safeguards for the accused provide
broad assurance that he or she will not be improperly convicted, serving the
community’s perception of fairness in the criminal justice system. In 2005,
the New Jersey state committee promulgating recommendations on the
proper allocation of peremptory challenges explained in its memorandum
that the state “represents ‘the people,’ including, in a broad sense, the
jurors.”171 However, because the right to a trial by jury “is a right possessed
by the defendant, the Committee determined that defendants should receive
more peremptory challenges than the State.”172 Further, the Committee
explained that a limitation in the absolute number of peremptory challenges
along with an unequal allocation of peremptories between the defense and
prosecution would not “adversely affect the interests of fairness and
167

Kira Lerner, Civil Rights Groups Sue Mississippi Prosecutor for Illegally Striking
Black Jurors, APPEAL (Nov. 18, 2019), https://theappeal.org/civil-rights-groups-suemississippi-prosecutor-for-illegally-striking-black-jurors/
[https://perma.cc/5AZF-JPX2].
The lawsuit stated, “The honor and privilege of jury service is a defining feature of what it
means to be an American citizen . . . . When state or local officials bar a citizen from service
because he or she is Black, that discriminatory act is no mere indignity. It is an assertion that
the prospective juror is inferior—a second-class citizen who cannot be entrusted with the
responsibilities of full citizenship.” Id.
168
See Goldwasser, supra note 21, at 822 (The constitutional scheme “[d]oes not
envision an adversary proceeding between two equal parties. Rather, it recognizes [t]he
awesome investigative and prosecutorial powers of the government and is designed to redress
. . . [that] advantage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Roberts, supra note 6, at
1539–40 (noting that other aspects of the criminal justice system are “asymmetrical,”
including “greater access than the prosecution to pretrial discovery, including a right to the
production of favorable material; greater ability to appeal the outcome of a criminal case . . .
and, because of the federal unanimous verdict requirement, an ability—not shared by the
prosecution—to ‘win’ on the basis of just one juror vote”).
169
See Goldwasser, supra note 21, at 822.
170
Id.
171
N.J. SPEC. COMM. ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, supra note 111, at 8.
172
Id. at 53.
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justice.”173 In fact, the Committee expected that this arrangement would
“enhance in the eyes of the public the credibility of our system of
administering justice.”174
B. PRACTICAL EXERCISE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AND
ACTUAL FAIRNESS

Actual fairness concerns whether the defense and prosecution actually
use their peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner.175 Certain
studies that have considered both the prosecutorial and defense use of
peremptory challenges shed light on whether an equal or unequal allocation
of peremptory challenges is more likely to produce impartial juries. In one
such study, David Baldus and his colleagues examined the use of peremptory
challenges in capital cases in Pennsylvania to determine the extent of
discrimination in their use.176 The study found that: (1) discrimination on the
basis of race and sex by prosecutors and defense attorneys is widespread; (2)
nonetheless, prosecutors are “considerably more successful than defense
counsel in their attempts to control jury composition”; and (3) the
prosecution’s “‘advantage’ in the use of peremptory challenges” increases
the probability of death sentences for defendants, increases “discrimination
in the application of the death penalty,” and “denies defendants a trial by a
jury that includes at least one of their ‘peers.’”177 Further, Baldus’s study
found that the prosecution “disproportionately strik[es] black venire
members and defense counsel disproportionately strik[es] non-blacks.”178
The study also indicated that “most of the adverse impact of the current
system on jury decision making flows from the aggressive use of
peremptories by prosecutors against blacks and defense counsel against nonblacks.”179
Importantly, one theory Baldus considered was the “canceling out”
theory of prosecutorial and defense peremptory challenges, which
hypothesizes that each side’s peremptory challenges tend to offset the effects
of the other side’s.180 The study suggested that this theory was relatively valid
173

Id. at 8.
Id.
175
Note, supra note 163, at 2131.
176
See David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner &
Barbara Broffitt, The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and
Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 10 (2001).
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Id. at 121–22.
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Id. at 130.
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Id. at 96.
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if “viewed in the aggregate.”181 In other words, across all cases, the efforts of
the two sides could reasonably be described as canceling each other out, and
the defense may even have the upper hand.182 This is because “defense
counsel use[d] a larger proportion of their peremptories” than did the
prosecution, resulting in a higher strike rate for the defense.183 However, the
study demonstrated a key prosecutorial advantage.184 Because the prime
targets of the prosecution were “substantially smaller in number than were
defense counsel’s prime targets,” the prosecution was more effective in
depleting members of the target group.185 The study found, for example,
that when two “prime [prosecution] targets, young black men and women,
were present in a venire, they were completely eliminated 78% and 67% of
the time, respectively . . . .”186
The authors also touched on the practical incentive structure that shapes
the prosecution’s discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges, namely,
the importance of obtaining convictions.187 Specifically, they discussed
Philadelphia, where for years prosecutors abided by a jury selection model
set forth in a 1986 training video, the McMahon Tape.188 The video, which
focused on how prosecutors could obtain more criminal convictions,
provided instructions on how to select a “conviction prone” jury.189 The tape
explained that “the worst jurors . . . are ‘blacks from the low-income areas’”
because they have a “resentment for law enforcement [and] . . . for
authority.”190 Similarly, in connection with a survey he was conducting on
North Carolina’s Batson cases, a North Carolina trial judge “found that in the
1990s North Carolina prosecutors circulated and used a ‘cheat sheet’ of
approved reasons for minority strikes that included such reasons as ‘lack of
eye contact,’ [and] ‘air of defiance’ . . . .”191 Prosecutors continue to use
similarly illegitimate reasons to strike jurors today, and a convict at costs
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See id. at 125.
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Id. at 11.
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Id. at 41.
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Id. at 42 (quoting videotape transcript: Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, DATV
Productions) (on file with University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law).
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Id. at 42 (quoting Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, supra note 189).
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culture persists in many offices around the country.192 Thus, not only are
prosecutors more successful in eliminating their target groups, but the
pressure to secure convictions can also encourage prosecutors to utilize
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, degrading both perceived
and actual fairness.
To conclude, in Batson v. Kentucky, Justice Marshall argued that only
complete abolition of the peremptory challenge would prevent prosecutors’
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.193 He explained that abolition
of the peremptory challenge for both the prosecution and the defense would
be fair because it would apply to both the prosecution and defense equally,
much like the argument that equalization would be fair because it would
apply equally to the prosecution and to the defense.194 However, the history
of the peremptory challenge and debates that have followed calls for reform
demonstrate that abolition will likely continue to be opposed and may be
impossible to implement in the near future.195 Further, it is questionable
whether abolition of the peremptory challenge would even lead to fairer
results.196 At the very least, an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges
is necessary to serve the goal of fairness. Inequality in the peremptory
challenge context promotes both the accused’s and the community’s
perceptions of fairness and mitigates the prosecution’s practical incentive to
secure convictions by eliminating its target groups from the jury.

See id.; see also John Terzano, Changing the “Convict at All Costs” Culture of
Prosecutor’s Offices, HUFFPOST (March 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entr
y/changing-the-convict-at-a_b_367864 [https://perma.cc/7RSP-NV9V].
193
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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See id. at 107–08.
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See, e.g., Marder, supra note 12, at 1686 (“Even though [groups seeking jury reform]
recognize that the peremptory challenge has been difficult to police and has led to juries that
are less diverse than they might otherwise be, they have been unwilling to recommend the
elimination of the peremptory.”).
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See Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner & Broffitt, supra note 176, at 129
(“[O]nly a few criminal law practitioners appear willing to counter the strong and widespread
belief on both sides that peremptories are critical to protect their clients’ interests. Judicial
abolition, therefore, seems unlikely, as the United States Supreme Court and most state and
federal courts appear content with the symbolic compromise they have created. The prospects
of abolition by State legislatures seem equally unlikely.”); Richard Gabriel, Thank and
Excuse: Five Steps Toward Improving Jury Selection, JURY EXPERT (Aug. 28, 2015),
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2015/08/thank-and-excuse-five-steps-toward-improving-juryselection [https://perma.cc/NVL3-MEQ9] (“The elimination of peremptory challenges would,
in fact, harm the rights of the parties to obtain a fair and impartial jury and is a wrong-headed
solution to a very real problem that does exist in today’s jury selections across the country.”).
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD: THE POTENTIAL PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVE
PROSECUTION
This Comment has, until this point, primarily considered arguments that
have already been offered by commentators regarding whether the relative
allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and defense
should be equal or unequal. One influence on the justice system that may
limit the need for an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges is
“progressive prosecution.” This Part describes the emergence of the
progressive prosecution movement and considers whether the movement can
serve perceived and actual fairness, making an unequal allocation of
peremptory challenges unnecessary. It posits that if equality in the number of
peremptory challenges is a worthy goal—to provide victims of sexual
violence with a sense of recognition of their rights and experiences, for
example—then the progressive prosecution movement may provide a
solution by increasing the broader community’s perception of fairness and
by providing a check on the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in
practice.
A. BACKGROUND ON PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION

Prosecutors, as relatively free agents in the justice system, have the
ability to exercise substantial discretion. For this reason, some scholars have
called on prosecutors to voluntarily waive their peremptory challenges197 or
to put in place “voluntary reforms” to minimize the government’s exercise
of racially-focused peremptory challenges.198 One scholar notes that
“prosecutors themselves have the institutional ability to transform
prosecutorial culture and incentives from the inside.”199 Further, scholars
have argued that rules of ethics and the possibility of disciplinary sanctions
197

See, e.g., Howard, supra note 158.
Burke, supra note 163, at 1471–73 (“In light of Batson’s failure to alter a stubborn
pattern of using peremptory challenges in racialized ways, scholars have repeatedly called for
the abolishment of peremptory challenges. But, despite criticism of the practice, every
jurisdiction in the country continues to employ peremptory strikes. . . . Doctrinal change, rules
of ethics, and disciplinary sanctions would not be necessary, however, if lawyers abated
racialized jury selection through their own voluntary conduct.”); see also Howard, supra note
158, at 372 (“The unique litigation role and ethical responsibilities of criminal prosecutors,
however, make them particularly suited to a cost-benefit analysis of peremptory challenges.”);
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Stephen R. Greenwald, Harold Reynolds & Jonathan Sussman,
Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1365
(2009) (“Ethical prosecutors, perhaps, are in the best position to prevent egregious misconduct
by other attorneys. Thus, prosecutor offices can evaluate methods of training and supervising
lawyers, and when a violation occurs in a specific office, that office should reassess its
training.”).
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Burke, supra note 163, at 1473.
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may be successful in reducing discriminatory use of the peremptory
challenge.200 These arguments express confidence in individual lawyers to
abstain from violating Batson and, in simple terms, control themselves.
However, other scholars are more wary of placing faith in the individual
prosecutor. Some argue that the view in various Supreme Court decisions
that prosecutors use peremptory strikes “fairly” and to “secure an impartial
trial,” rather than to manipulate jury composition in order to obtain a
conviction, is “unfounded.”201 Others lament the fact that “the stereotypical
attitudes that have guided the use of the peremptory challenge have been
difficult to change.”202
While change at the level of the individual prosecutor or prosecutor’s
office may have previously seemed overly optimistic, with the emergence of
the “progressive prosecution” movement, there is reason to believe that selfregulation could become the norm. Since 2015, many prosecutors running
for District Attorney, State’s Attorney, and similar positions across the
country have professed a commitment to “reducing mass incarceration,
eliminating unwarranted racial disparities [in the criminal justice system],
and seeking justice for all, including the accused.”203 Progressive
prosecutors, who tend to come from more diverse backgrounds,204 typically
emphasize that “the criminal justice system is failing to promote fairness”
and promise to pursue justice rather than convict at all costs.205
This movement has gained widespread support from many in the legal
community and has brought a sense of hope that prosecutors “hold the key”
200

Id. at 1472.
Heinz, supra note 32, at 215.
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Morehead, supra note 14, at 633.
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Angela J. Davis, Reimagining Prosecution: A Growing Progressive Movement, 3
UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV 1, 2 (2019).
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Lucy Lang, SF Election Advances Progressive Prosecution Movement, S.F. CHRON.
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Seema Gajwani & Max G. Lesser, The Hard Truths of Progressive Prosecution and
a Path to Realizing the Movement’s Promise, 64 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 69, 72 (2020); see Jeffrey
Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 5) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3479165 [https://perma.cc/GEM7-CEYW]
(“Bazelon makes a strong case that the new wave of prosecutors, not legislators, governors,
police, or judges, ‘hold the key to change.’”) (citing EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW
MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION xxvii
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and discretion to reduce the incarceration rate and eliminate unwarranted racial disparities in
the criminal justice system.”); see also John Terzano, Changing the “Convict at All Costs”
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to changing the justice system for the better.206 Some support for the
movement centers on prosecutors’ ideology and professed commitment to
fairness and reducing racial bias.207 The shift in mindset away from focusing
on convictions or being “tough on crime”—or rhetoric suggesting such a
shift—inspires confidence that these prosecutors will be committed to
implementing real policy and procedural changes while in office.208 Other
supporters offer a hopeful view of prosecutors’ status as discretionary agents
who can implement change faster than judges or legislators.209 For example,
Emily Bazelon argues that reform-minded prosecutors can change the justice
system more effectively than any other actors in the near term, given that
they can regulate their own conduct and to some extent the conduct of other
prosecutors.210 She explains, “While it would be nice if lawmakers and the
courts threw themselves into fixing the criminal justice system, in the
meantime, elections for prosecutors represent a shortcut to addressing a lot
of dysfunction.”211 Supporters have cited policies that prosecutors have
implemented, such as reforms to cash bail systems, reduced sentencing
recommendations, and plea bargaining, as evidence that the movement has
enjoyed success.212
206

Bellin, supra note 205, at 4 (citing BAZELON, supra note 205, at xxvii).
See Davis, supra note 203, at 2 (“[I]n recent years, a number of incumbent district
attorneys have been challenged and defeated by individuals who pledged to use their power
and discretion to reduce the incarceration rate and eliminate unwarranted racial disparities in
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U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
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(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3542792) [https://perma.cc/2
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cure, many commentators and reformers have come to argue that replacing the discretionary
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However, skeptics have important concerns. First, while head
prosecutors run for election on promises of reform, line prosecutors—who
make up the bulk of prosecutors at trial—are influenced by institutional and
personal factors and need not worry as much about oversight or liability for
their actions.213 Regardless of head prosecutors’ promises to pursue justice
rather than convictions, line prosecutors operate within an adversarial system
and are interested in succeeding in their careers.214 Further, line prosecutors
do not have their District Attorneys sitting over their shoulders watching
them prosecute trials, and thus prosecutorial accountability is low.215 Because
incentives other than the vision of reform with which newly elected
progressive District Attorneys enter office shape line prosecutors’ conduct,
“there is significant potential for noncompliance from those on the lower
rungs of the hierarchy due to a lack of buy-in to the goals of the head
prosecutor.”216 Accordingly, implementing the reforms of a head prosecutor
may require line prosecutors to “restrain themselves in an environment in
which they have access to nearly unlimited leverage over defendants and face
a near-zero probability of legal liability for malicious acts.”217
A second problem stems from the various political dynamics across
jurisdictions, along with the fact that turnover from elections can dampen
progressive prosecutors’ ability to make widespread and lasting change, as
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more conservative prosecutors may take their place.218 According to Bazelon,
approximately twelve percent of the population lives in a community with a
District Attorney who could be considered progressive.219 While this is
significant, not every jurisdiction welcomes progressive prosecution
ideology.220 For example, prosecutors who ran for District Attorney on a
progressive ideology in Sacramento and San Diego, California, lost to
incumbent District Attorneys in those districts by a significant margin.221 To
some, these failures “provide[] an early warning sign that the progressive
prosecution platform may hold little currency with voters outside of a limited
number of cities.”222
On the other hand, progressive prosecutors have won elections in more
conservative districts. For example, five progressive District Attorneys were
“elected in major cities in Texas,” including Dallas and San Antonio.223 For
example, in 2016, Kim Ogg was elected as District Attorney in Houston. 224
Once in office, Ogg supported bail reform and declined to prosecute minor
drug offenses.225 She successfully “implemented a review system that seeks
consensus among [prosecutors in her office] before levying capital
charges.”226 Further, she “dismissed thirty-seven prosecutors from her office
[and] hired a progressive defense attorney as her chief of staff.”227 Still, the
progressive prosecution movement relies primarily on voters, who are
“notoriously fickle.”228 For this reason, some argue that progressive
prosecutors should not be viewed as a “one-way ratchet toward leniency,” as
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voters may be swayed by an uptick in crime or other external events to seek
a return to the prosecutor who promises to be tough on crime.229
B. PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION & THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE

Despite its limitations, the progressive prosecution movement could
greatly reduce the discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge and could
therefore justify the states’ trend toward an equal allocation of peremptory
challenges between the prosecution and defense. There are two main reasons
for this. First, progressive prosecutors have committed to reducing racial
biases in the criminal justice system and have the potential to increase the
community’s perception of fairness in criminal procedure, lessening the need
for a lower number of peremptory challenges for the prosecution. Second,
the movement has resulted in policy changes that have made criminal
procedure fairer. If extended to exercising peremptory challenges in a
nondiscriminatory way, these changes could lessen the need for the safeguard
of the defendant’s additional peremptory challenges.
First, regarding the community’s perception of justice, progressive
prosecutors have greater potential than their predecessors to increase
perceived fairness. This not only applies with respect to the criminal justice
system as a whole but also with respect to demonstrating a commitment to
non-discrimination in criminal procedure. These prosecutors are not only
making promises of procedural fairness—their promises are being conveyed
directly to the public. In this way, the progressive prosecution movement has
brought transparency to one of the least transparent electorally accountable
positions in government.230 As journalist Sam Reisman explains, “[T]he rise
of the progressive prosecutor represents new voter awareness about the roles
prosecutors play in assessing what charges to bring, whether to incarcerate,
negotiating plea deals and recommending sentencing.”231 Further, data on
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these prosecutorial decisions, which some progressive prosecutors have
voluntarily elected to make public, “may be used to identify patterns of
constitutional violations and disparate treatment of defendants and/or
victims.”232
Awareness surrounding the progressive prosecution movement has also
been fueled by outside forces, including educational programs by
organizations such as the ACLU.233 As a result, there appears to be a greater
awareness among various communities about prosecutorial elections,
progressive prosecutors’ goals and policies, and how they are implementing
change in the system.234 Prosecutorial transparency and a greater awareness
of prosecutors’ commitment to ending discriminatory conduct is important
in the context of peremptory challenges because it can increase the
community’s confidence in and perception of prosecutorial fairness at the
trial level. If prosecutors can be trusted to engage in conduct that is
nondiscriminatory, then the need, at least from an “optics” standpoint, for a
lower number of peremptory challenges than that granted to the defense is
lessened.
It is important to note that prosecutors have not explicitly addressed the
issue of peremptory challenges, at least not outwardly to the public.
However, there is evidence that progressive prosecutors have successfully
implemented safeguards that might reduce racial biases in other areas of
criminal procedure, which suggests that prosecutors may also have success
in limiting the abuse of the peremptory challenge. For example, some
prosecutors’ offices have recently added or expanded conviction integrity
units that check line prosecutors’ work.235 This would hopefully include
prosecutors’ jury selection and Batson records. As another example,
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner has said, “We are not going to
overcharge . . . . We are not going to try to coerce defendants. We are going
to proceed on charges that are supported by the facts in the case, period.”236
To that end, Krasner requires prosecutors “to get his approval on any plea
232
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offer” that carries a prison sentence of greater than fifteen to thirty years.237
Krasner’s efforts have had real results: the office filed “18 percent fewer
cases than in 2017, including 25 percent fewer misdemeanors.”238 Further,
prosecutors in his office opened 6,500 fewer cases in the year after he was
elected to District Attorney than they opened in the previous year.239
Similarly, Kim Foxx “issued guidelines to the prosecutors in her office,
ordering them to proactively ask for pretrial release in appropriate cases,”
among other reforms.240 A year after Kim Foxx entered office, “the Cook
County jail population had decreased by more than 1,000 people.”241
Further, two principles proposed by The Progressive Prosecutor’s
Handbook, a guide for progressive prosecutors to navigate the difficulties of
implementing change in their offices, 242 address Batson violations—one
directly and one indirectly. These principles indicate that progressive
prosecutors can implement concrete policies to eliminate abuse of the
peremptory challenge.243 For example, the author warns that progressive
prosecutors “[should not] countenance jokes about evading Batson” and
should make clear to line prosecutors that procedural fairness is expected.244
The author also suggests that progressive prosecutors hire diverse line
prosecutors and supervisory prosecutors, as offices with a more diverse
makeup are less likely to tolerate racism, “coded or explicit.”245
Further, many progressive prosecutors themselves are racially and
ethnically diverse or come from diverse backgrounds, and many have
implemented policies to address diversity.246 For example, Kim Foxx is the
first African-American woman to serve as District Attorney for Cook
County, Illinois.247 Additionally, Larry Krasner, a former public defender,
launched a nationwide effort to recruit more diverse Assistant District
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Attorneys.248 Upon taking office, Krasner “fired 31 of the office’s
prosecutors” and “immediately began recruiting and filling the open
positions with lawyers who share his vision of criminal justice reform.”249
This effort included recruiting public defenders and law students from
historically black law schools.250 Diversity among lead and line prosecutors
can serve the perception of the justice system as fairer for the community,
and particularly for diverse members of the community.
Ultimately, closer examination of empirical data will be required to
determine whether the movement can present a solution that serves as a
compromise between those who support an unequal number of peremptory
challenges and those who believe the number should be equal. Thus, an
unequal allocation of peremptory challenges should be maintained in the
federal system and among states that have not equalized the number of
peremptory challenges allocated between the prosecution and defense while
awaiting evidence that progressive prosecution can justify equalization.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the peremptory challenge is a revered, yet perplexing,
and in some corners detested, facet of the American criminal justice system.
It is unlikely that peremptory challenges will be abolished any time soon, and
thus, we are left to determine how to properly use and allocate them while
maintaining fairness for the accused, victims of crimes, and the community
at large. The arguments supplied in the 1977 debates that resulted in the
federal system declining to allocate an equal number of peremptory
challenges to the defense and prosecution remain relevant to the federal
system and states today, notwithstanding the failures of Batson. At this time,
allocating a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense is
necessary to maintain both the perception of fairness in the justice system
and actual fairness in the exercise of peremptory challenges at trial.
Accordingly, the federal system and remaining states that maintain an
unequal number of peremptory challenges should continue to do so—at least
for now. There is potential for the progressive prosecution movement to
supplant the role that the unequal allocation of peremptory challenge plays
in maintaining fairness. However, the progressive prosecution movement is
young and it is likely too early to tell whether the movement will persist and
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what its consequences will be.251 Thus, while the movement holds promise
for the peremptory challenge, whether it can justify equalizing the number of
peremptory challenges cannot yet be determined, and the legal community
must consider further empirical evidence on its successes before making that
decision. In the meantime, stasis is the best solution.
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